Does sanctioning disabled claimants of unemployment insurance increase labour market inactivity? An analysis of 346 British local authorities between 2009 and 2014 by Reeves, Aaron
  
Aaron Reeves 
Does sanctioning disabled claimants of 
unemployment insurance increase labour 
market inactivity? An analysis of 346 British 
local authorities between 2009 and 2014 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Reeves, Aaron (2017) Does sanctioning disabled claimants of unemployment insurance 
increase labour market inactivity? An analysis of 346 British local authorities between 2009 and 
2014. Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, 25 (2). pp. 129-146. ISSN 1759-8273 
 
DOI: 10.1332/175982717X14939739331029 
 
© 2017 Policy Press 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/83688/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: July 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
April 2017. Forthcoming in Journal of Poverty and Social Justice.
Dǈƾǌ ǌƺǇƼǍǂǈǇǂǇǀ ƽǂǌƺƻǅƾƽ ƼǅƺǂǆƺǇǍǌ ǈƿ
ǎǇƾǆǉǅǈǒǆƾǇǍ ǂǇǌǎǋƺǇƼƾ ǂǇƼǋƾƺǌƾ ǅƺƻǈǎǋ
ǆƺǋǄƾǍ ǂǇƺƼǍǂǏǂǍǒ? AǇ ƺǇƺǅǒǌǂǌ ǈƿ ѱѲ6 BǋǂǍǂǌǁ
ǅǈƼƺǅ ƺǎǍǁǈǋǂǍǂƾǌ ƻƾǍǐƾƾǇ ѰѵѵѴ ƺǇƽ ѰѵȢѲ
Aaron Reeves*
London School of Economics
a.reeves@lse.ac.uk
April 12, 2017
Abstract:
Imposing financial penalties on claimants of unemployment insurance may incentivise
labour market re-entry. However, sanctions may have differential effects depending on
thework-readiness of the claimants. Here, I explorewhether sanctioningdisabled claimants
is associated with greater labour market activity or inactivity among disabled people us-
ing data on 346 British local authorities between 2009 and 2014. When the number of
sanctioned disabled claimants rises (as a proportion of all claimants) the proportion of
economically inactive people who are also disabled becomes larger. There is not a clear
relationship between sanctioning disabled claimants the proportion of employed people
who are disabled.
IǇǍǋǈƽǎƼǍǂǈǇ
It has become increasingly common across many European countries to link access to certain
forms of social security, such as unemployment insurance, to behavioural conditions. These
new behavioural expectations extend the long-standing eligibility criteria that determine ac-
cess to these entitlements (Venn 2012). For example, claimants of Jobseekers Allowance (JSA)
– the name of unemployment insurance in the UK – were required to be unemployed and
*I would like to thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.
This project would not have been possible without various government departments providing freely available
data to researchers. Data in this project has always been provided by the UK Data Archive.
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ready to work, a criteria that has been in place since its inception (Hills 2015). More re-
cently, eligible recipients of JSA are now also required to perform certain tasks to demon-
strate their entitlement, such as attending appointments or providing evidence of job searches.
The Conservative-led coalition changed the conditions of entitlement, making themmore de-
manding and specific whilst strengthening the financial consequences for failing to meet these
conditions (Watts et al. 2014). During this period, the number of people being sanctioned –
those who have their unemployment insurance payments temporarily stopped – doubled. In
2009/10, approximately 2.3 claimantswere sanctioned per 100 claimantswhile in 2014/15 this
had risen to 4.5 sanctions per 100 claimants.
Yet, there is still debate about the effectiveness of sanctions. A growing body of evidence indi-
cates that sanctions increase financial hardship andmay also lead to welfare exit (Oakley 2014,
Work and Pensions Committee 2015). If a single claimant aged 25 or over is sanctioned for
four weeks – the basic level – then this individual loses around £300 (NAO 2016). For some
households this will not be a substantial sum but for many of those claiming JSA this will have
a non-trivial impact on their short-term economic security. In total, the value of benefit pay-
ments not made in 2015 alone (less the amount received in hardship payments) is just under
£100 million (NAO 2016). Given this reduction in financial support for low-income house-
holds, rising sanction rates across local authorities are associated with a greater likelihood of a
foodbank opening in that local authority and is linkedwithmore people using foodbanks in the
same area (Loopstra et al. 2015a). A recent report from the National Audit Office argued that
sanctions can lead to ‘hardship, hunger and depression’ (NAO 2016). Moreover, there is evi-
dence from frontline agencies that sanctions may disproportionately affect individuals already
at risk of social exclusion (Work and Pensions Committee 2015).
Advocates of sanctions claim that the financial penalty itself coupled with the threat of an in-
come reduction will encouragemore individuals to comply with the conditions, and that com-
pliance will lead more people to re-enter employment. The rational-action models motivating
this expectation are plausibly grounded in theories of incentives and agentic choice and there
is some evidence suggesting sanctions increase the probability of re-employment. Neil Coul-
ing (2013), a previous Director for Working Age Benefits at the Department for Work and
Pensions, has argued that “many benefit recipients welcome the jolt that a sanction can give
them” and that being sanctioned is a “wake-up call” that helps people “get back into work”.
Abbring and colleagues (2005) use administrative data from a social security program in the
Netherlands and find that sanctioned claimants of unemployment insurance are more likely to
re-enter employment. Exploiting local variation in the strictness of the sanction regime across
Germany, Boockmann and colleagues (2014) find that re-employment rates are higher in ar-
eas where sanctions are applied more rigorously. Similar results are also observed in other
European countries (Lalive, Zweimuller and van Ours 2005).
However, not all studies suggest sanctions improve labour market outcomes, i.e., improving
employment (being in work) rather than unemployment (out of work but actively seeking em-
ployment) or economic inactivity (out of work but not actively seeking employment). For ex-
ample, the introduction of sanctions in the US – as part of Clinton’s welfare reforms – did not
have strong effects on employment (Wu, Cancian andWallace 2014). Moreover, sanctions also
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seem to produce lower wages, more unemployment days post-sanction, and shorter periods
in work (Arni, Lalive and Van Ours 2013, Fording, Schram and Soss 2013, Hofmann 2012).
Importantly, arguments in favour of sanctions assume that suitable work is available for job-
seekers in their area, but this is not always the case. One of the missing components of the
debate around sanctions has been appropriate interventions in the demand-side of the labour
market (Grover and Piggott 2016). This is clearly seen in the UK, where the rapid expansion of
sanctioning coincided with a period of high unemployment. Existing evidence exploring this
period indicates rising sanction rates within local authorities increased the off-flow rate (the
number of people leaving JSA) without increasing employment rates (Loopstra et al. 2015b).
Moreover, their results indicate that the vastmajority of people leaving JSA end up in unknown
destinations, suggesting that sanctions may have had a minimal impact of labour market out-
comes but may – as seen in other contexts – have increased welfare exit (Arni, Lalive and Van
Ours 2013).
Sanctions are sometimes assumed to have relatively stable effects across different groups but
this overlooks the different capabilities of particular jobseekers. For example, much less is
known about how sanctions affect people living with an impairment or a long-term limiting
health condition, a large proportion ofwhomalso experience unemployment (Baumberg, Jones
andWass 2015, Reeves et al. 2014). Of course, disabled job seekers are not completely different
from other job seekers. Like other unemployed people, job seekers living with work-limiting
condition may not take up work when it is available; and so conditionality may incentivise re-
employment for those living with a disability just as it does for others who are not currently in
work (Martin 2015). One Norwegian study observed that compulsory dialogue meetings for
workers who are long-term sick reduced absence from work and reduced the risk of labour
market exit (Markussen, Roed and Schreiner 2015), suggesting that introducing conditionality
at certain junctures may help keep people in work who are at risk of transitioning out of the
labour market due to ill health.
However, in other ways, unemployed persons who are living with a disability are unlike other
job seekers (Baumberg-Geiger 2017). They face reduced work capability and are a far more
heterogeneous group in terms of their work-readiness for some occupations and in terms of
the supports thatmay enable them to becomework-ready. Consequently, unemployed persons
living with a disability may respond to sanctions quite differently than persons who are not
living with a disability. For example, JSA claimants who report living with a longstanding
limiting condition may respond to a sanction by trying to move off JSA and onto Employment
SupportAllowance (ESA); social security for thosewho are unable towork due to longstanding,
work-limiting condition, according to a work capability assessment. Other jobseekers may be
less able to make this transition, suggesting sanctions may have heterogeneous effects across
these groups
Further, disabled people may find it more difficult than other jobseekers to adhere to condi-
tions established with the caseworker (Baumberg 2015), which may lead to more sanctions in
areaswhere there aremore disabled people claiming JSA (Reeves and Loopstra 2017). This dis-
connect between expectations and capabilities may undermine the relationship between case-
worker and claimant, potentially severely reducing the effectiveness of other efforts to increase
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work-readiness (Hasluck andGreen 2007). One evaluation of amandatorywork-related activ-
ities scheme found that such conditionality reduced the period spent in employment over the
next year (Rehwald, Rosholm andRouland 2015). In short, applying sanctions fairly to disabled
claimants is difficult and costly and, when done incorrectly, sanctions may actually negatively
impact activation (Pickles et al. 2016).
Re-employment rates among people livingwith a disabilitymay also be particularly sensitive to
local labourmarket conditions (Benitez-Silva, Disney and Jimenez-Martin 2010). For example,
part of the rise in unemployment among disabled people is due to changes in the structure of
work over the last 30 years. During this period, there has been a marked decline in job control
(i.e., the ability to take autonomous decisions in the work place) in the UK labour market and
this has had the impact of disabling a larger share of the population from participating in the
labour market (Baumberg 2014). People living with a disability may still be functionally able
to perform a wide variety of jobs (Broersen et al. 2012) but in an open job market disabled
individuals compete with others whomay be perceived to be more productive; and so capacity
in the context of competition does not necessarily lead to employment in appropriate jobs. If
the local labour market does not contain appropriate work for disabled people then sanctions
may put pressure on people to accept work that is ill-suited to their capabilities, potentially
leading to a negative cycle of low-pay/no-pay (Shildrick et al. 2012). Thus, applying sanctions
to JSA claimants living with a disability may push people into economic inactivity, especially
if there is high background unemployment thereby making it more difficult to find work.
Some disabled people – facedwith the prospective of being sanctioned or accepting low-pay or
otherwise inappropriate work – may exit the labour market entirely (e.g., by seeking to claim
ESA) but theymay also exit social security entirely. Under-claiming is already common among
those who feel stigmatised because they are receiving social security, something keenly felt by
disabled claimants (Garthwaite 2014). Sanctions add financial penalties to stigma, potentially
deepening the stigmatisation and exacerbating under-claiming (Patrick 2016).
Of course, sanctions are not unique to Jobseekers Allowance claimants; they are also applied to
people receiving Universal Credit and Employment Support Allowance. Like JSA, Universal
Credit expects claimants to sign a ‘ClaimantCommitment’which stipulates certain behavioural
conditions that entitle people to financial support. Failure to adhere to the commitment may
result in a sanction. Unfortunately, sanction reports forUniversal Credit are not published sys-
tematically, restricting the types of analysis that can be conducted using these data. Some but
not all of those on ESA can be sanctioned; only those inWork-Related ActivityGroup (WRAG).
The NAO’s (2016) recent report finds that when sanctions were applied to ESA claimants that
theywere less likely to findwork andweremore likely to become disconnected from the labour
market. Although ESA sanctions are a crucial component of the story linking sanctions and
labourmarket outcomes they are still relatively rare compared to JSA sanctions – creating sub-
stantial missing data at the local authority level – and so do not form a core part of this analysis.
In this paper, I therefore focus on sanctions applied to a specific group: those who are claim-
ing Jobseekers Allowance who describe themselves as possessing ‘a physical or mental impair-
ment which has a substantial and long-term effect on their ability to carry out normal day to
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day activities’. This group are particularly interesting because they may be more likely to find
complying with the claimant commitment difficult (and therefore may be more likely to be
sanctioned) (Reeves and Loopstra 2017) but also because they may struggle to find work in a
labour market where unemployment is high. Applying sanctions to this group may have quite
different implications from sanctions applied to those on Universal Credit or sanctions ap-
plied to those on Employment Support Allowance. In fact, lumping all sanctions together may
actually obscure important heterogeneity in how sanctions affect these quite different groups.
In terms of those receiving Jobseekers Allowance, sanctioning people looking for work who
nevertheless have somework-limitationsmaymotivate re-employment; but it may also lead to
economic inactivity and welfare exit. On this question, the current evidence is simply unclear.
To move this debate forward, I test whether local authorities with higher sanction rates have
larger proportions of economically inactive disabled people or whether higher sanction rates
are associated with more disabled people in employment.
MƾǍǁǈƽǌ
DƺǍƺ ǌǈǎǋƼƾǌ
To answer these questions, I combined longitudinal data across local authorities and over time,
covering the years 2009/10 to 2013/14 (the latest available data for our key dependent vari-
able). Measures of the monthly JSA claimant count and the size of the working-age and total
population for local authority districts and unitary authorities come from Nomis (the labour
market information database). Data cover England, Scotland, andWales. Data on the monthly
number of young (ages 18-24) and older (over age 60, excluding pensioners) people were also
incorporated in the data set. These data were used to calculate the monthly claimant rates per
working age adult and the proportion of young and older people. Monthly rates were aver-
aged over fiscal years to make them comparable for other data sources. Census data – which
does not vary over time – were also used to calculate the demographic composition of local
authorities, such as the proportion of people who (1) report living with a disability (Are your
day-to-day activities limited because of a health problem or disability which has lasted, or is
expected to last, at least 12months?), (2) are lone parents, and (3) are white British. In addition,
I also create a measure of the proportion of JSA claimants that report living with a disability,
which is defined as ‘any physical or mental health conditions or illnesses lasting or expected
to last 12 months or more’. This measure has been used elsewhere and is calculated using the
Annual Population Survey (APS), available from the UK Data Archive (Reeves and Loopstra
2017). (These data are not available from the DWP).
The models also include measures of the composition of the employed, unemployed, econom-
ically inactive populations in each local authority. Specifically, data on the proportion of eco-
nomically inactive people that are disabled is taken from Nomis. This same measure is also
used for unemployed and economically active. I use these measures to understand whether
sanctions alter the economic activity of inactivity of disabled people in these local authorities
over time.
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The key predictor in our models is the number of adversely sanctioned claimants living with
a disability. One way of constructing this variable is to calculate the proportion of all dis-
abled claimants that are sanctioned, but this approach has a number of problems. The first
is data availability. The only measure of the number of disabled JSA claimants is from the
Annual Population Survey whereas the data on sanctions is published directly by the DWP.
Combining these two data sources – one from a sample survey, the other from actual admin-
istrative data – may introduce substantial measurement error. Instead, I calculate the number
of adversely sanctioned claimants living with a disability as a proportion of all JSA claimants.
This approach reduces the influence of outliers that may be created by small sample sizes in
each local-authority within the APS data. The second problem is scale. One local authority
may sanction 50% of their disabled claimants but if disabled claimants only comprise 1% of all
claimants (rather than 5% of all claimants) then this is less likely to have major impacts on the
composition of the labour market than the regions where disabled claimants comprise a larger
share of all claimants. By calculating the number of adversely sanctioned claimants living with
a disability as a proportion of all JSA claimants, this measure gives more weight to data points
where sanctions are disproportionately affecting claimants living with longstanding limiting
conditions.
Data on the number of sanctions applied to claimants living with a disability in each local au-
thority are taken from Stat-Xplore (DWP 2016). The data on the number of adverse sanctions
incorporates the total after any successful reviews, reconsiderations, or appeals. In short, this
measure only reflects those decisions where claimants experienced a financial loss that was
not successfully appealed – i.e., potentially reimbursed – at a later time. How is disability de-
fined in these data? According to Freedom of Information request 2013-2901, the disability
measures for JSA reflects that “a person can self-declare in the Job Centre whether or not they
consider themselves to ‘have a physical ormental impairmentwhich has a substantial and long-
term effect on their ability to carry out normal day to day activities”’ (FoI 2013). Yet, these are
people who are not – for reasons that are not entirely clear in these data – seeking Employ-
ment Support Allowance (ESA). There could be two reasons they are in this situation: 1) these
may be people who have been incorrectly categorized as ‘fit-for-work’ due an ill-administered
work capability assessment or 2) these may be people who regard themselves as possessing an
impairment but who define themselves as ‘fit-for-work’.
Two local authorities were removed from the analysis due to small sample populations (Isle of
Scilly and the City of London) and some are excluded because ofmissing observations on some
of the variables. These missing values occur when cell values from Nomis or Stat-Xplore are
very small and risk identifying individuals. After these exclusions we have an analytic sample
of 2067 local authority-years covering 346 local authorities.
SǍƺǍǂǌǍǂƼƺǅ ƺǇƺǅǒǌǂǌ
The analysis has two parts. First I estimate the association between the disability economic
inactivity rate and the number of disabled people who are sanctioned (as a proportion of the
total number of claimants). This model adjusts for the disability employment rate. In short,
this model asks: if we compare two local authorities (A and B) with the same disability em-
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ployment rate, what happens to the proportion of economically inactive disabled people if the
sanction rate for disabled people is higher in local authority A than local authority B. In short,
this models tests whether sanctions increase the number of disabled people who are econom-
ically inactive compared to unemployed. If individual-level data were available this would be
similar to estimating a multinomial logistic regression model, where the question of interest
is the likelihood of an unemployed person becoming economically inactive after being sanc-
tioned.
The second part of the analysis considers the opposite question. Here I explore the association
between the disability employment rate and the number of disabled people who are sanctioned
(as a proportion of the total number of claimants). This model adjusts for the disability eco-
nomic inactivity rate. In short, this model asks: if we compare two local authorities (A and B)
with the same disability economic inactivity rate, what happens to the proportion of employed
disabled people if the sanction rate for disabled people is higher in local authority A than local
authority B. This models tests whether sanctions increase the number of disabled people who
are employed compared to unemployed. Again, this similar to examining the likelihood of an
unemployed person becoming economically active after being sanctioned.
As an additional step, I re-estimate these models using so-called ‘fixed-effect’ regression mod-
els. These models account for differences between local authorities that are constant over the
time period of the study and that may be unobserved, such as the composition of the regional
distribution of work-limitations or attitudes toward welfare recipients. One of the advantages
of this approach is that it enables me to examine what happens within local authorities over
time, estimatingwhether, for example, the disability economic inactivity rate increases asmore
disabled people are sanctioned in a particular local authority. Of course, despite its strengths,
this approach cannot rule out the possibility that unobserved trends that more in parallel with
both sanctions and the composition of the economically active and so these results should be
interpreted with some caution. The final model to test the association between sanctions and
the proportion of economically inactive people who are disabled can be formally written as
equation 1:
EconInactDisabij = + 1DisabSanctionij + 2EmpDisabij + 3JSAClaimantsij
+ 4JSAOlderij + 5JSAY oungij + 6JSADisabij+
7LAPopij + i + ij (1)
Here i is local authority and j is fiscal year. EconInactDisab is the proportion of econom-
ically inactive people living with a disability, DisabSanction is the number of disabled JSA
claimants sanctioned as a proportion of all JSA claimants,EmpDisab is the proportion of em-
ployed people who are disabled, JSAClaimants is the number of JSA claimants as a propor-
tion of theworking-age population, JSAOlder is the proportion of JSA claimants over the age
of 60, JSAY oung is the proportion of JSA claimants aged between 18 and 24, JSADisab is
the proportion of JSA claimants living with a disability,LAPop is the size of population in the
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local authority (transformed onto a log-scale),  is the constant,  is the local-authority fixed-
effects, and  is the error term. Standard errors are clustered to reflect the non-independence
of the sampling procedure.
Note that the measures of the proportion of the local authority population that are Disabled,
Lone Parents, andWhite are not included in the fixed-effects models because they are constant
over time. They are, however, included in the all the repeated, cross-sectional models.
Equation 1 can also be altered to consider a separate hypothesis. Here, EconInactDisab be-
comes an independent variablewhileEmpDisabbecomes the dependent variable. In thismodel,
I am testing whether an increase in the rate of disabled people being sanctioned is associated
with more disabled people in the labour market.
To ensure these results are not due tomodelling choices, I also conduct some robustness checks.
For example, I re-estimate the main models using an algorithm that sequentially estimates ev-
ery possible combination of our independent variables (Young and Holsteen 2017). This pro-
vides an estimate of how much the observed associations reported in this paper are due to
modelling decisions. I also conduct falsification tests. First I examine whether the association
between sanctions and economic activity is associated with the sanction rate for all claimants
(rather than the more specific measure of the sanction rate among people living with disabil-
ities). Second, I examine whether the economic activity among disabled people is associated
with the rate at which ethnic minorities are sanctioned. Here I would not expect a clear asso-
ciation.
Descriptive statistics are reported in table 1.
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Table 1: Raw data on HIV prevalence and their data sources
Variable N Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max Source
Number of sanctioned disabled
claimants (% of claimants)
2,067 0.94 0.44 0.20 3.66 Stat-Xplore
Proportion of economically inac-
tive that are disabled
2,067 28.84 8.45 6.70 63.60 Nomis
Proportion of employed that are
disabled
2,067 65.57 9.47 28.20 90.60 Nomis
JSA claimants (% of working-age
population)
2,067 3.07 1.41 0.62 8.81 Stat-Xplore
JSA claimants aged 55-64 (% of
claimants)
2,067 2.16 0.94 0.31 7.03 Stat-Xplore
JSA claimants aged 18-24 (% of
claimants)
2,067 27.36 4.30 10.56 38.55 Stat-Xplore
JSA claimants who report a dis-
ability (% of claimants)
2,067 28.10 25.21 0.00 100.00 APS1
Population (log-scale) 2,067 11.85 0.53 10.44 13.91 Nomis
Households with a disability (%) 2,067 25.81 3.31 17.20 34.90 2011 Census
Lone parent households (%) 2,067 10.06 2.19 6.50 19.00 2011 Census
White British ethnicity (%) 2,067 89.78 12.62 29.00 98.90 2011 Census
1 - Annual Population Survey
RƾǌǎǅǍǌ
DǂǌƺƻǂǅǂǍǒ, ǌƺǇƼǍǂǈǇǂǇǀ, ƺǇƽ ǅƺƻǈǎǋ ǆƺǋǄƾǍ ǌǍƺǍǎǌ
First, I examine whether local authorities that sanction more disabled people (as a proportion
of all claimants) have a larger share of economically inactive people that also report health
conditions or illnesses lastingmore than 12months. Table 2 shows that – holding constant the
proportion of employed people that are disabled in a local authority – a positive association
between the number of disabled people as a proportion of all claimants and the proportion of
economically inactive people who are disabled. This suggests that as more disabled people are
sanctioned there is also a greater number of disabled people who are neither employed nor
looking for work, in short they disengage from the labour market altogether. Of course, cross-
sectional regression models assume but do not test the direction of causality. Here, I assume
that sanctions cause economic inactivity but it is theoretically possible that the relationship
flows in the other direction; that higher disability inactivity rates cause more disabled JSA
claimants to be sanctioned. While theoretically possible, this seems unlikely; especially because
the most plausible mechanisms linking sanctions and economic inactivity flow from sanctions
to economic outcomes.
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Table 2: Local authorities that sanction more disabled claimants have higher rates of
disabled people who are economically inactive
Proportion of disabled people who are
economically inactive (%)
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of disabled people sanctioned 0.85** 0.54** 0.48** 0.31*
(% of claimants) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Proportion of disabled people who -0.85** -0.89** -0.90** -0.88**
employed (%) (0.0073) (0.0094) (0.0093) (0.011)
Number of JSA claimants -0.40** -0.48** -0.60**
(% of population) (0.065) (0.073) (0.080)
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.17 0.012
(0.089) (0.099)
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 0.084** 0.024
(0.018) (0.027)
Proportion of claimants who are -0.025** -0.025**
disabled (0.0028) (0.0028)
Total population (logged) 0.023
(0.14)
Percentage of households with a 0.15**
disability (0.035)
Percentage of lone parent households -0.025
(0.064)
Percentage of White households -0.0059
(0.0078)
Constant 83.9** 87.9** 86.9** 85.1**
(0.48) (0.82) (1.01) (2.36)
Local-authority years 2067 2067 2067 2067
R2 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.91
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered to reflect non-independence of sampling. Data on
household composition comes from 2011 census. Proportion of claimants who are disabled is calculated from
Annual Population Survey. * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
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Next, I add covariates, including the proportion of JSA claimants in the local authority, the age
composition of claimants, the proportion of claimants that are living with a disability, the pop-
ulation in the local authority, the proportion of households with a person living with a disabil-
ity, the proportion of lone parent households, and the ethnic composition of local authority. As
expected, the proportion of economically inactive people that are disabled is associated with
the proportion of employed people who are disabled and the proportion of households that
have a disabled person within them. Further the proportion of economically inactive people
that are disabled is lower in local authorities where there is more JSA claimants and the pro-
portion of JSA claimants that are also disabled is higher. Importantly, the relationship between
disabled people being sanctioned and the proportion of economically inactive disabled people
is not explained by these possible confounding factors. Adding these variables does attenuate
the association between sanctioning disabled people and economic inactivity but they do not
entirely remove the association across local authorities.
Second, I re-estimate the same models except now the dependent variable is the proportion of
employed people who are disabled and the models control for the proportion of economically
inactive people who are disabled (Table 3). Here, I want to test whether local authorities that
sanction a larger number of disabled people (as a proportion of all claimants) also have more
disabled people in work (as a proportion of all employed people). Initially, I observe that local
authorities that sanctionmore disabled people also havemore disabled people in employment;
however, this relationship is very sensitive to confounders. For example, the size of the coeffi-
cient declines substantially after adjusting for variables that are correlated with both sanctions
and employment. Moreover, the null hypothesis can no longer be rejected at the ￿ = 0.05 level
after adjusting for the proportion of JSA claimants in the local authority, suggesting that lo-
cal authorities with large proportions of people on JSA are also areas of the country where
fewer employed people report a disability and where fewer disabled people are sanctioned. It
is precisely in labour markets where there is high unemployment and where a large share of
the unemployed do not report a limiting physical or mental condition that it might be harder
for people with disabilities to find work and where disabled people are not being sanctioned.
If we standardize the covariates – using the Gelman (2008) method - the association between
sanctions and economic inactivity is twice as large as the association between sanctions and
employment among disabled people (0.016 vs 0.008).
Figure 1 compares the two coefficients from the fully adjustedmodels for both outcomes. Here
we see that there is a strong positive association between more disabled people being sanc-
tioned and more disabled people who are economically inactive. Whereas there is a weaker
albeit positive association between more disabled people being sanctioned and more disabled
people who are employed. These results suggest that sanctionsmay increase employment rates
among the disabled but the evidence is weak. In contrast, we do have fairly strong evidence
that sanctions increase economic inactivity among people living with a disability. Of course,
the confidence intervals for both coefficients overlap and so there is some uncertainty about
whether sanctions affect the labour market outcomes of disabled people in different ways.
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Table 3: Local authorities that sanction more disabled claimants have do not have clear
association with the proportion of disabled people who are employed
Proportion of disabled people who are
employed (%)
Covariates (1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of disabled people sanctioned 1.13** 0.18 0.13 0.17
(% of claimants) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16)
Proportion of disabled people who -1.06** -0.96** -0.96** -0.94**
inactive (%) (0.010) (0.0095) (0.0090) (0.010)
Number of JSA claimants -1.07** -1.10** -0.85**
(% of population) (0.052) (0.059) (0.081)
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.21* 0.13
(0.092) (0.11)
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 0.096** 0.057*
(0.017) (0.026)
Proportion of claimants who are -0.027** -0.026**
disabled (0.0029) (0.0029)
Total population (logged) -0.068
(0.15)
Percentage of households with a -0.068
disability (0.038)
Percentage of lone parent -0.11
households (0.060)
Percentage of White households 0.026**
(0.0084)
Constant 95.1** 96.4** 94.2** 95.5**
(0.36) (0.33) (0.67) (1.98)
Local-authority years 2067 2067 2067 2067
R2 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.93
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered to reflect non-independence of sampling. Data on
household composition comes from 2011 census. Proportion of claimants who are disabled is calculated from
Annual Population Survey. * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
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Figure 1: Comparing the association between higher sanctions rates among disabled people
and economic activity
-.01
0
.01
.02
.03
Pe
rce
nta
ge
 po
int
 ch
an
ge
Change in Inactive disability rate Change in Employed disability rate
Notes: Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals. Point estimate for ‘Disabled who are Inactive’ is taken from
table 1, model 4. Point estimate for ‘Disabled who are Employed’ is taken from table 2, model 4.
TƾǌǍǂǇǀ Ǎǁƾ ǋƾǅƺǍǂǈǇǌǁǂǉ ǐǂǍǁǂǇ ǅǈƼƺǅ ƺǎǍǁǈǋǂǍǂƾǌ ǈǏƾǋ Ǎǂǆƾ
The results so far only suggest that local authorities that sanction more disabled JSA claimants
also have a larger share of economically inactive people that are also disabled. Next, I test
whether these relationships hold within local authorities over time, adjusting for local author-
ity differences that are constant across the study period. This is important because the ob-
served association between sanctions and labour market activity among disabled people may
be explained by unobserved confounding factors that constant over time. In table 4, I report
the results for both models. Model 1 suggests that when a local authority increases the rate at
which it sanctions disabled people that the disability economic inactivity rate rises. However,
Model 2 indicates, again, that the association with the disability employment rate is positive
but weaker and more uncertain. As mentioned above, the results from this fixed-effects model
cannot rule out the possibility that an unobserved confounder may be correlated with changes
in our main variables.
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Table 3: Local authorities that sanction more disabled claimants have do not have clear
association with the proportion of disabled people who are employed
Proportion of disabled people who are
Economically
inactive (%)
Employed (%)
Covariates (1) (2)
Number of disabled people sanctioned 0.44* 0.32
(% of claimants) (0.22) (0.21)
Proportion of disabled people who -0.86**
employed (%) (0.012)
Proportion of disabled people who -0.91**
inactive (%) (0.012)
Number of JSA claimants (% of population) -0.48* -0.36
(0.24) (0.23)
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.072 -0.050
(0.19) (0.20)
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 0.051 0.065
(0.047) (0.046)
Proportion of claimants who are disabled -0.023** -0.025**
(0.0031) (0.0033)
Total population (logged) -0.52 2.96
(5.06) (4.83)
Local-authority fixed-effects Y Y
Local-authority years 2241 2241
R2 0.79 0.79
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered to reflect non-independence of sampling. Data on
household composition comes from 2011 census. Proportion of claimants who are disabled is calculated from
Annual Population Survey. Constant estimated but not reported. Both models adjust for time dummies
and local-authority differences that are constant across this period. * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
Despite this limitation, these fixed-effects models reinforce the primary conclusion from the
cross-local authority regression models, namely that when more disabled people are sanc-
tioned that there are more disabled people who are economically inactive. Moreover, this re-
lationship holds even after adjusting for the economic situation in the labour market and the
demographic composition of JSA claimants. Further, the fixed-effects models also provide a
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stronger test of these relationships suggesting that sanctioning disabled people is more closely
associated with more disabled people moving into economic inactivity.
TƾǌǍǂǇǀ ǋǈƻǎǌǍǇƾǌǌ
These findings may, of course, be due to various modelling decisions. Here, I test the robust-
ness of these estimates to such modelling decisions by sequentially estimating every possible
combination of the control variables (although the proportion of disabled people who are em-
ployed or economically inactive and the sanction rate for disabled people are included in every
model).
Here I find that for those models predicting the disability economic inactivity rate the sign
is positive in 100% of the models and the p-value of the coefficient between sanctions and
economic inactive is significantly different from zero in 89% of these models (Table 5). Finally,
the robustness ratio is 2.4, which is far higher than the significance threshold of 2 (similar to
a t-statistic). This suggests a high level of robustness for these models (Young and Holsteen
2017).
Table 3: Local authorities that sanction more disabled claimants have do not have clear
association with the proportion of disabled people who are employed
Economic inactivity Estimate
Robustness ratio 2.39
Sign stability 100%
Significance rate 89%
Employment Estimate
Robustness ratio 1.14
Sign stability 100%
Significance rate 49%
A measure of the employment rate among disabled people was always included in every model for the
economic inactivity robustness tests. Likewise, a measure of the economic inactivity rate among disabled
people was always included in every model for the employment robustness tests. Robustness ratio is similar
to a t-statistic for robustness. It is calculated by dividing the preferred point estimate by the total standard
error of models (combining both sampling standard errors and modelling standard errors). Robustness ratios
greater than 2 are considered to be results that are robust.
In contrast, for those models predicting the disability employment rate the sign is positive in
100% of the models but the p-value of the coefficient between sanctions and employment is
significantly different from zero in 49% of these models (Table 5). Finally, the robustness ratio
is 1.1, which is far lower than the significance threshold of 2. This suggests a very low level of
robustness for these models, indicating that the relationship is highly uncertain and probably
positive, but close to zero (Young and Holsteen 2017).
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SƾǇǌǂǍǂǏǂǍǒ ƺǇƽ ƿƺǅǌǂƿǂƼƺǍǂǈǇ ǍƾǌǍǌ
I also conduct a series of falsification tests: first, I test whether the results are sensitive to the
inclusion of time dummies, finding they are not (Web Appendix 1). Second, I test whether
the total sanction rate is associated with the proportion of disabled people who are economi-
cally inactive or employed, finding that it is not (Web Appendix 2). These models suggest that
sanctions increase economic inactivity among disabled people only when disabled people are
sanctioned. Third, I test whether the sanction rate among non-White people is associated with
the disability economic inactivity rate, finding, again, it is not (Web Appendix 3). These fal-
sification tests give these findings a higher degree of specificity because the rise in economic
inactivity associated with sanctioning disabled people is not explained by sanctions among
unrelated groups. One important modelling choice was the decision to include a measure of
an alternative labour market outcome in each regression model. Now, I re-estimate the main
model predicting the disability economic inactivity rate without controlling for the disability
employment rate (and vice versa), finding no change in our findings (Web Appendix 4).
DǂǌƼǎǌǌǂǈǇ
Sanctions are increasingly used to encourage labour market activity among both those who
are directly sanctioned and those who may be sanctioned if they do not comply with the con-
ditions associated with receipt of social security (Venn 2012). There is also some evidence
that sanctions increase the rates of re-employment (Abbring, van den Berg and vanOurs 2005,
Boockmann, Thomsen and Walter 2014), even if they also appear to be associated with lower
wages upon re-entry, shorter spells inwork, and greaterwelfare exit (Arni, Lalive andVanOurs
2013, Fording, Schram and Soss 2013, Hofmann 2012). However, few studies have considered
how sanctions affect the labour market outcomes of specific groups exposed to sanctions and
conditionality (Markussen, Roed and Schreiner 2015). In short, there is particular concern that
some groups – particularly those living with disabilities – may be disproportionately affected
by sanctions and that they may be more likely to exit welfare as a result of being sanctioned
(NAO 2016, Reeves and Loopstra 2017). To move this debate forward, I have examined varia-
tion in sanctions rates among the disabled across local authorities and over time in connection
with labour market activity among disabled people in the same area.
Two important conclusions emerge from these results. First, when the number of disabled
people who are being sanctioned in a local authority rises there is also a rise in the disability
economic inactivity rate, suggesting that sanctioning disabled people may be pushing people
away from the labour market. If, indeed, sanctions are pushing people off of JSA then they are
also serving to increase financial hardship among an already economically vulnerable group
of people (Loopstra et al. 2015a). What is much less clear from these results is what happens
to these individuals in terms of their connection to different forms of social security. It is
possible that disabled JSA claimants who have been sanctioned my try to claim Employment
Support Allowance. Alternatively, theymay – if their circumstances allow or necessity dictates
- disconnect from social security entirely.
Second, I do not find a clear relationship between high employment rates among the disabled
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and greater sanctioning of disabled JSA claimants, suggesting the impact of sanctioning on
re-employment among disabled people is at best modest and at worst zero. These estimated
associations are not explained by a range of confounders nor by unobserved differences be-
tween local authorities over time. Importantly, I find that the association between sanctioning
and economic inactivity is not sensitive to model specification while the association between
sanctioning and employment rates among disabled people is highly sensitive tomodelling deci-
sions. More work is needed; but these results cautiously suggest that sanctions are not helping
disabled people into work.
There are, however, important limitations to this study. First, the data used in this analysis
relies on aggregate data at the local authority level. One consequence of using aggregated data
is that it is impossible to know whether the people sanctioned are also the same individuals
who are moving into economic inactivity or into employment. Sanctions, of course, affect
both those directly penalised and also those who could potentially be penalised if they fail to
comply with conditionalities. Despite this, these results have a high degree of specificity and
are informed by previous evidence which is grounded in individual-level analyses. Second, as
with all models, there is the possibility unobserved factors that influence both the independent
and dependent variables may explain the statistical relationships documented here. While this
cannot be ruled out, it is clear that the relationships documentedhere are fairly stable regardless
of the control variables included in the model, suggesting that the confounder would need
to explain a substantial proportion of the variation between the independent and dependent
variable if it were to remove the relationship between sanctions and the disability economic
inactivity rate completely.
Third, themeasures of economic inactivity and employment among disabled people are imper-
fect. Even when using aggregate data, it would be preferable to utilise measures of the propor-
tion of disabled people who are employed and inactive rather than the proportion of employed
(or economically inactive) people who are disabled. Fourth, this analysis has focussed on sanc-
tions that have been applied and not rescinded, but even sanctions that have been successfully
appealed may alter incentives and increase hardship, suggesting that future analyses should
examine how different outcomes from the original sanction decision may influence employ-
ment trajectories. Fifth, due to data limitations, this paper does not look at sanctions applied
to ESA recipients. This will be an incredibly important area of future work. Sixth, the measure
of disability which informs this study is based on a binary indicator that denotes someone as
either possessing a work-limiting condition or not. This measure ignores the different types
of work-limiting conditions and the regional distribution of these conditions. Some local au-
thorities may have more people with more challenging work-limitations than others and this
may affect the relationship between sanctions and economic activity. However, assuming that
the regional distribution of work-limitations is fairly stable over time, these differences would
be accounted for by the fixed-effects model.
There is a clear need for more research able to address the important limitations of this and
other studies. In particular, the effect of sanctions will likely vary across different groups and
any assessment of the effectiveness of sanctions will need to consider whether sanctions may
disproportionately harm already vulnerable groups (Work and Pensions Committee 2015).
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This may require the Department for Work and Pensions to conduct detailed in-house anal-
yses using existing data sources and may even require new evaluations to assess the cost-
effectiveness of these changes to social security (NAO 2016).
Taken together, these results suggest that sanctioning disabled people may lead to greater eco-
nomic inactivity and, to a lesser extent, greater employment among disabled people. However,
the association between sanctioning and greater employment is highly sensitive tomodel spec-
ification and is much closer to zero. In contrast, the association between sanctions and greater
economic inactivity has a high degree of robustness and the association is approximately twice
as large as the association between sanctions and employment. Similar to other work using
aggregate-level data (Loopstra et al. 2015b), these findings cannot rule out the possibility that
sanctioning disabled people does encourage some people to enter work faster than they would
have done in the absence of a sanction. However, this association appears to be relatively mod-
est, especially compared to the influence that sanctions may be having on JSA off-flow among
disabled claimants.
Sanctions are intended to activate labour market participants, motivating them to seek work
in ways that are consistent with government expectations pertaining to what makes a good job
search (Oakley 2014, Venn 2012). Yet, sanctions accomplish this by placing additional burdens
on the jobseeker, thereby increasing the work-demands of claiming unemployment insurance.
There is some evidence suggesting that the new conditions attached to claiming JSA may sys-
tematically disadvantage disabled claimants, making it more difficult for them to remain in
the job seeker category (Reeves and Loopstra 2017). Increasing work-demands have led to
greater economic inactivity among thosewith disabilities (Baumberg 2014). Similarly, increas-
ing claimant-demands may have led to even greater economic inactivity. Sanctions, then, may
have the opposite of their intended effect among people living with a disability, pushing them
further away from the labour market and deeper into poverty (Patrick 2011).
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Wƾƻ AǉǉƾǇƽǂǑ
Web Appendix 1: Association between number of disabled people sanctioned and economic
activity with local-authorities over time, including time dummies.
Web Appendix 2: Association between total number of people sanctioned and economic activ-
ity with local-authorities over time.
Web Appendix 3: Association between total number of non-white people sanctioned and eco-
nomic activity with local-authorities over time.
Web Appendix 4: Association between number of disabled people sanctioned and economic
activity across local-authorities over time, without adjusting for the alternative labour market
outcome.
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Web Appendix 1: Association between number of disabled people sanctioned and economic
activity with local-authorities over time, including time dummies.
Proportion of disabled people who are
Economically
inactive (%)
Employed (%)
Covariates (1) (2)
Number of disabled people sanctioned 0.39* 0.32
(% of claimants) (0.16) (0.18)
Proportion of disabled people who -0.88**
employed (%) (0.011)
Proportion of disabled people who -0.94**
inactive (%) (0.011)
Number of JSA claimants -0.56* -0.87**
(% of population) (0.089) (0.087)
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 -0.015 0.38*
(0.15) (0.15)
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 0.028 0.049
(0.028) (0.028)
Proportion of claimants who are disabled -0.025** -0.026**
(0.0031) (0.0030)
Total population (logged) 0.021 -0.0055
(0.14) (0.14)
Percentage of households with a 0.14** -0.059
disability (0.036) (0.038)
Percentage of lone parent -0.038 -0.069
households (0.071) (0.060)
Percentage of White households -0.0062 0.026**
(0.0078) (0.0083)
Time-dummies Y Y
Local-authority years 2067 2067
R2 0.91 0.93
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered to reflect non-independence of sampling. Data on
household composition comes from 2011 census. Proportion of claimants who are disabled is calculated from
Annual Population Survey. Constant estimated but not reported. * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
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Web Appendix 2: Association between total number of people sanctioned and economic
activity across local-authorities over time.
Proportion of disabled people who are
Economically
inactive (%)
Employed (%)
Covariates (1) (2)
Number of people sanctioned 0.54 0.0024
(% of claimants) (0.042) (0.046)
Proportion of disabled people who -0.88**
employed (%) (0.011)
Proportion of disabled people who -0.94**
inactive (%) (0.011)
Number of JSA claimants -0.62* -0.87**
(% of population) (0.079) (0.079)
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.035 0.15
(0.079) (0.079)
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 0.023 0.055*
(0.027) (0.025)
Proportion of claimants who are disabled -0.025** -0.026**
(0.0028) (0.0029)
Total population (logged) -0.014 -0.086
(0.14) (0.14)
Percentage of households with a 0.14** -0.061
disability (0.035) (0.037)
Percentage of lone parent -0.026 -0.11
households (0.064) (0.059)
Percentage of White households -0.0058 0.026**
(0.0078) (0.0084)
Local-authority years 2067 2067
R2 0.91 0.93
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered to reflect non-independence of sampling. Data on
household composition comes from 2011 census. Proportion of claimants who are disabled is calculated from
Annual Population Survey. Constant estimated but not reported. * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
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Web Appendix 3: Association between total number of non-white people sanctioned
and economic activity across local-authorities over time.
Proportion of disabled people who are
Economically
inactive (%)
Employed (%)
Covariates (1) (2)
Number of non-white people sanctioned 0.56 0.0029
(% of claimants) (0.16) (0.17)
Proportion of disabled people who -0.89**
employed (%) (0.011)
Proportion of disabled people who -0.94**
inactive (%) (0.011)
Number of JSA claimants -0.63* -0.87**
(% of population) (0.078) (0.079)
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 0.044 0.15
(0.10) (0.11)
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 0.023 0.056*
(0.027) (0.026)
Proportion of claimants who are disabled -0.025** -0.026**
(0.0028) (0.0029)
Total population (logged) -0.012 -0.087
(0.14) (0.14)
Percentage of households with a 0.16** -0.061
disability (0.035) (0.036)
Percentage of lone parent -0.019 -0.11
households (0.064) (0.060)
Percentage of White households -0.0033 0.027*
(0.011) (0.012)
Local-authority years 2067 2067
R2 0.91 0.93
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered to reflect non-independence of sampling. Data on
household composition comes from 2011 census. Proportion of claimants who are disabled is calculated from
Annual Population Survey. Constant estimated but not reported. * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
25
Web Appendix 4: Association between number of disabled people sanctioned and economic
activity across local-authorities over time, without adjusting for the alternative labour
market outcome.
Proportion of disabled people who are
Economically
inactive (%)
Employed (%)
Covariates (1) (2)
Number of disabled people sanctioned 0.94* -0.71
(% of claimants) (0.44) (0.49)
Number of JSA claimants 0.94* -1.74**
(% of population) (0.29) (0.29)
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 55-64 -0.65* 0.74*
(0.31) (0.32)
Proportion of JSA claimants aged 18-24 -0.15 0.20*
(0.092) (0.091)
Proportion of claimants who are disabled -0.012* -0.015*
(0.0058) (0.0061)
Total population (logged) 0.50 -0.54
(0.40) (0.41)
Percentage of households with a 1.25** -1.25**
disability (0.11) (0.11)
Percentage of lone parent 0.44* -0.53*
households (0.22) (022)
Percentage of White households -0.17** 0.19**
(0.035) (0.036)
Local-authority years 2067 2067
R2 0.48 0.56
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered to reflect non-independence of sampling. Data on
household composition comes from 2011 census. Proportion of claimants who are disabled is calculated from
Annual Population Survey. Constant estimated but not reported. * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
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